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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 
(Utah 1984) / Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992), and Rule 
42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
determination of this case: 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3) (1984): 
If the final determination of the executive director is 
consistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
recommended by the hearing officer, the court shall review 
the record and may alter the final determination only upon a 
1
 This appeal is not governed by the Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-l to 63-46(b)-22. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 (1984), the 1986 petition 
came before the District Court on appeal rather than as a trial 
de novo. 
1 
finding that the final determination is capricious, or not 
supported by the evidence. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b)(Emphasis added): 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with 
these rule or any order of court, a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After 
the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a 
jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the 
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as the 
trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless 
the court otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication of the merits. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 
dismissing Country Meadows Convalescent Center, Inc.'s ("Country 
Meadows") appeal, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for failure to prosecute where Country Meadows 
made no efforts to move the appeal forward for a period exceeding 
five years? 
2. Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of a motion for summary judgment once the case was 
dismissed for failure to prosecute? 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Point I involves the trial court's discretion in 
dismissing a case for failure to prosecute. Wilson v. Lambert, 
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure 
Sports, Inc., 740 P. 2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987). A party 
challenging a District Court's ruling must show that "it is clear 
from the record that [the trial court] abused its discretion." 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Point II involves a question of law concerning the 
court's continuing jurisdiction after dismissal; thus, a 
correction-of-error standard applies, with no deference accorded 
to the lower court's ruling. State, Dept. of Social Services v. 
Vilil, 784 P. 2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a case to determine 
whether the District Court correctly dismissed Country Meadows' 
appeal for failure to prosecute and whether the District Court 
erred when it subsequently granted the Division of Health Care 
Financing's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Prior to July 1981, nursing 
homes operating in the State of Utah received Medicaid 
i 
reimbursement on a cost-by-cost basis2 and various other 
factors. Since the reimbursement standards frequently changed 
during this pre-1981 period, nursing homes in Utah were required 
to maintain accurate expense records and file extensive cost 
reports to be reviewed by the Division of Health Care Financing, 
Utah Department of Health, the designated agency responsible for 
administering Utah's Medicaid program. R. 712. 
For the reporting period from September 3, 1978 to June 30 
1979, Country Meadows, an Ogden, Utah, nursing home, requested 
reimbursement for costs incurred by C.W. Barney, Inc. for the 
construction of the nursing home. These construction costs 
included a 10% contractor's fee. R. 3, 18. The Division of 
Health Care Financing, however, determined that, pursuant to 
Federal Medicaid Regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 405.427 ("§ 427" ),3 
2
 After 1981, Congress passed an amendment to 42 C.F.R § 
405.427, known as the Boren Amendment, which required nursing 
homes to be reimbursed on the basis of a flat rate methodology 
and not a cost-by-cost basis. 
3
 42 C.F.R. § 405.427 is a federal regulation relating to 
the rate of reimbursement for expenses incurred in the 
construction and operation of facilities that service Medicaid 
recipients. Under § 427, costs applicable to related entities 
are included within the reimbursement only to the extent that 
they reflect actual costs to the related organization. Under § 
427, related "means that the provider to a significant extent is 
associated or affiliated with or has control of or is controlled 
by the organization furnishing the services." 42 C.F.R. § 
405.427(b)(1) (1984). 
4 
C.W. Barney, Inc. and Country Meadows were deemed "related 
entities" and therefore entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for 
the costs of nursing home construction only. The application of 
this regulation therefore disqualified Country Meadows' request 
for the additional contractor's fee in the amount of $38,344.00. 
R. 15, 17-18, 276. Specifically, the Division found that Carl 
Barney was not only the nursing home contractor, but also that 
Carl Barney held a substantial interest in Country Meadows. R. 
17-18. 
On September 3, 1983, Country Meadows sent a letter to the 
Division requesting an appeal of the Division's original audit. 
R. 277. On February 24, 1984, following several informal 
conferences between Country Meadows and the Division, Country 
Meadows requested that a formal hearing be conducted pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 26-23-2(1), which states in pertinent part: 
"If the matter cannot be resolved at the informal hearing, the 
aggrieved person may then request a hearing before an impartial 
hearing officer appointed by the department . . .." Utah Code 
Ann. (1984). R. 4, 72-73. On July 9, 1985, a formal hearing was 
held before Robert M. Archuletta, Esq., an administrative law 
judge for the Department of Health. R. 9. Both parties were 
represented by counsel. R. 9. 
On February 26, 1986, the hearing officer rendered a 
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preliminary decision and order and affirmed the Division's 
position that Country Meadows was not eligible for the 
contractor's fee based on the following findings: 1) Carl W. 
Barney, Inc., was related to the provider Country Meadows 
Convalescent Center to a significant extent by possessing 
significant ownership or equity in the provider through C.W. 
Barney, Inc., which built the facility. R. 41; 2) Carl W. 
Barney, Jr., had the power to control the bid price and overhead. 
R. 41; 3) Carl W. Barney, Jr.,, through his close business 
partnership with Eva S. Barney, exercised power to reduce 
competition for construction of Country Meadows and, by so doing, 
Country Meadows in effect obtained the construction of the 
facility for itself. R. 41; and 4) Eva S. Barney never sought 
nor received any other construction bids for Country Meadows 
while there was a potentially open, competitive market. R. 41. 
On March 27, 1986, Dr. Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director, 
Utah Department of Health, ("Executive Director"), remanded the 
hearing officer's decision on the grounds that the hearing 
officer had incorrectly applied an "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard of review rather than the correct "preponderance of 
evidence" standard required at such hearings. R. 45. 
On June 4, 1986, the hearing officer then rendered an 
Amended Recommended Decision which applied the correct standard 
6 
and affirmed the previous findings of the Recommended Decision 
and Order of February 26, 1986. R. 47-50. On June 12, 1986, the 
Executive Director affirmed the amended decision and entered a 
final determination in favor of the Division's denial of the 
contractor's fee. R. 52. 
On July 11, 1986, Country Meadows sought judicial review of 
the final decision and filed a Petition for Review before the 
Third District Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(2) 
(1984). R. 2. On August 4, 1986, the Division filed its Answer 
to Country Meadows' Petition for Review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-23-2(2) (1984). R. 62-65. 
The record in the instant case reveals that no further 
action was taken in this case by Country Meadows for a period of 
over five years. Consequently, on December 17, 1991, the 
Division of Health Care Financing filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. R. 704-713. 
On December 30, 1991 Country Meadows filed a Motion in 
Opposition to the Division's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute.4 R. 714-720. On January 7, 1992, Country Meadows 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment stating that hearing officer 
* This represents the only action taken by Country Meadows 
in furtherance of this appeal since the initial filing of Country 
Meadow's Petition for Review in July 1986. 
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had erred in its ruling. R. 730-800. On January 21, 1992, the 
Division filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that 
there was no material issue of fact upon which Country Meadows 
could claim relief. R. 808-822. 
On February 3, 1992, a hearing was held before Judge Dennis 
Frederick in the Third District Court. R. 824. Following 
argument from both sides, the trial court granted the Division's 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and the Division's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 824. On March 13, 1992 
Country Meadows brought this appeal. R. 832-834. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 15, 1978, Eva S. Barney ("Mrs. Barney") and her 
son, Carl W. Barney, a general contractor and sole owner of C.W. 
Barney, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, ("Carl"), entered into a 
partnership, known as Country Meadows Convalescent Center, Inc., 
to build and operate a nursing home known as Country Meadows. R. 
11-12. Appellant, Country Meadows, is a nursing home located in 
Ogden, Utah, which provides intermediate and skilled nursing care 
to Medicaid recipients. R. 3. The circumstances giving rise to 
this appeal occurred between September 3, 1978 and June 30, 1979, 
a period of more than 14 years ago, and relate to a claim by 
Country Meadows involving Medicaid reimbursement for the 
construction costs for a new facility owned by Country Meadows. 
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R. 11-15. Pursuant to the terms of their partnership, Mrs. 
Barney contributed the land for the nursing home and held a 20% 
interest in the partnership. R. 13. Carl contributed 
$176,000.00 in up-front costs and received an 80% interest in the 
partnership of this new nursing home. R. 13. 
Construction of Country Meadows was pursuant to a contract 
agreement that stated that Carl would receive the costs of the 
construction, plus a 10% contractor's fee. R. 15. While some 
preliminary estimates were received, neither Mrs. Barney nor the 
partnership solicited outside bids to compare the projected costs 
of construction.5 R. 14, 41, 160-162. At all times during the 
partnership, it was understood that Carl would perform all of the 
construction for the nursing home. R. 14. In his testimony 
before the hearing officer, Carl stated: "I guess I always 
assumed we were the best for the job. There was never any doubt 
in my mind we would do it." R. 14. On September 3, 1978 the 
facility opened under the name Country Meadows Convalescent 
Center. R. 16. At that time, Carl was named facility 
5
 The fact that Barney did not solicit nor consider any 
outside bids is significant in that it points directly to the 
relationship between the partnership (Country Meadows) and the 
contractor (C.W. Barney, Inc.). In its reimbursement scheme, § 
427 will only allow those costs to the related organization which 
are actually incurred and which do not exceed the price of 
comparable services, facilities, or supplies by alternative 
entities. 42 C.F.R. S 405.427 (1984). 
9 
administrator and the prior partnership agreement was reformed in 
the State of Delaware as a corporation with Carl and Mrs. Barney 
maintaining primary ownership. R. 17. 
Pursuant to Country Meadows' request for reimbursement for 
construction costs associated with the nursing home, the Division 
of Health Care Financing denied the contractor's fee in the 
amount of $38,344.00, in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 405.427. R. 
18. That amount reflected the 10% contractor's fee which Mrs. 
Barney and Carl had agreed to in their contract. 
The Executive Director for the Department of Health affirmed 
the Division of Health Care Financing's decision that Country 
Meadows and C.W. Barney, Inc. were "related entities" under 
relevant federal Medicaid regulations and were therefore 
ineligible to receive reimbursement for the 10% contractor's fee. 
R. 764, 787, 796, 798. On July 11, 1986, Country Meadows filed 
an appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 (1984) in the 
Third District Court. R. 2. 
From August 4, 1986, when the Division of Health Care 
Financing filed its Answer to Country Meadow's Petition of Review 
to December 17, 1991, when the Division filed a Motion to Dismiss 
For Failure to Prosecute, there were no attempts made by Country 
Meadows to move its appeal forward pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
26-23-2 (1984). R. 706. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by 
dismissing Country Meadows' appeal for failure to prosecute 
pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where 
Country Meadows made no efforts to move its appeal forward for a 
period exceeding five years. The duty to prosecute is a duty of 
due diligence imposed upon plaintiff, not defendant. Country 
Meadows offers no credible explanation or justifiable excuse for 
its dilatory conduct throughout the dormancy of its case. Even 
after receiving the 1988 letter from the Division relating to 
subsequent reimbursement questions, Country Meadows failed to 
prosecute its pending appeal. Therefore, the trial court 
coreectly dismissed Country Meadows' appeal in light of its 
inexcusable neglect. 
Furthermore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of the Division's Motion for Summary Judgment once 
Country Meadows' appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
Dismissal acts as a termination of the case and voids a court's 
continuing jurisdiction to rule on pending matters. Thus, the 
trial court's subsequent order granting the Division's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be vacated. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING COUNTRY MEADOWS' APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO 
PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b). 
On December 17, 1991, the Division of Health Care Financing 
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. On February 
3, 1992, the district court granted the Division's Motion to 
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Country Meadows argues that the trial judge erred in granting the 
Division's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on two 
grounds: (1) that it was incumbent on the Division, not Country 
Meadows, to move this appeal forward; and (2) that dismissal 
would substantially prejudice it in light of subsequent Medicaid 
reimbursement issues involving the nursing home for FY's 1980 and 
1981. However, a review of the record in the instant case and 
relevant case law conclusively shows that the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in granting the Division's Motion to Dismiss 
in light of the dormancy of this matter over a protracted period 
of time. 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in 
pertinent part: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute . . . a defendant 
may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against 
him . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
12 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision . . 
. operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
A dismissal for failure to prosecute will not be overturned 
unless "it is clear from the record that [the trial court] abused 
its discretion." Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237, 239 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). In order to establish such an abuse of 
discretion, a party must demonstrate not only a "justifiable 
excuse," but also point to conduct by both parties which 
invalidates the finding of failure to prosecute. Id. at 239. 
The duty to prosecute with reasonable diligence is a duty 
imposed upon the plaintiff, not the defendant. As this Court has 
noted, affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff's case after three 
years of dilatory conduct: "The burden is on the plaintiff to 
prosecute a case in due course without unusual or unreasonable 
delay. Plaintiffs are required to 'prosecute their claims with 
due diligence, or accept the penalty of dismissal.'" Charlie 
Brown Constr., Inc. v. Leisure Sports > Inc., 740 P. 2d 1368, 1370 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Maxfield v Fishier, 538 P. 2d 1323, 1325 
(Utah 1975)); Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 239. The court 
in Charlie Brown ruled that where plaintiff had repeatedly 
forestalled prosecution of its case through stipulations and 
continuances, plaintiff failed to meet its burden and therefore, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing for 
lack of prosecution. 
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In the instant case, Country Meadows took no affirmative 
steps to move its appeal forward. On July 11, 1986, Country 
Meadows filed its original appeal in the Third District Court. 
After Country Meadows filed the appeal, it lay dormant for five 
and one-half years until the Division of Health Care Financing 
filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on December 
17, 1991. Country Meadows offers no valid explanation or excuse 
for this delay. Country Meadows inexcusably neglected its duty 
of "due diligence" to prosecute its appeal as the moving party, 
and thus must be willing to accept the dismissal of its action. 
In ruling on a motion for dismissal for failure to 
prosecute, a trial court must examine: 
(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity 
each has dad ot move the case forward; (3) what each of 
the parties have done to move the case forward; (4) 
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to 
the other side; and (5) most important, whether 
injustice may result of the dismissal; 
K.L.C. Inc. v, McLean, 656 P. 2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982) (citing 
Westinahouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W, Larsen Contractor. 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)). In Westinahouse, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that: 
a trial court should have reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move forward • • . without justifiable 
excuse . . .[w]hether there is such a justifiable 
excuse is to be determined by considering more factors 
than merely the length of time since the suit was 
filed. 
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Westincrhouse, 544 P. 2d at 878-79. 
Country Meadows points to only two reasons why this Court 
should reverse Judge Frederick's ruling. First, it relies on a 
letter of June 8, 1988, from Kent Roner, Director of the Bureau 
of Financial Services, Division of Health Care Financing, Utah 
Department of Health, in which Roner recommended that Country 
Meadows not move forward on any subsequent matters concerning 
Medicaid reimbursement until resolution of its pending appeal of 
its 1979 claims. Country Meadows contends only that these 
subsequent reimbursement questions would be "substantially 
impacted" by the lower court's dismissal of this action. 
Second, without offering any excuse for its delay or its refusal 
to prosecute the instant claims, Country Meadows states that the 
Division of Health Care Financing should have moved the case 
forward itself. Both explanations, however, fall far short of 
the showing of justifiable excuse under the test enunciated in 
Westinqhouse. In short, Country Meadows' conduct is inexcusable 
and Judge Frederick was well within his discretion when he 
dismissed this appeal. 
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d at 240, the Court ruled 
that a plaintiff's dilatory conduct in failing to prosecute 
strongly outweighs any inaction on the part of the defendant. 
The Court found that despite a flurry of activity from the 
15 
plaintiff over a period of seven years, plaintiff Maxfield never 
exhibited a readiness to move toward trial. Id. The Court 
pointed out, that although the defendant forestalled litigation 
for a period of eighteen months — during which time plaintiff 
was also unable to proceed — the defendant had at all time 
expressed a willingness to proceed. Id. The Court found that 
the defendant, not the plaintiff, would be substantially 
prejudiced if the dismissal for failure to prosecute were not 
upheld, since nine years had passed since the incident occurred 
and much of its evidence was no longer available. .Id., at 240-41. 
In Maxfield, the Court then rejected plaintiff's argument 
that it too would suffer prejudice. The Maxfield Court stated 
that the plaintiff "had more than ample opportunity to prove his 
asserted interest and simply failed to do so. Such nonaction is 
inexcusable." Id. at 240. 
In the instant case, Country Meadows not only had the duty 
to prosecute its appeal, but also had ample opportunity to 
advance its claims against the Division of Health Care Financing• 
It simply failed to act for a period in excess of five years. 
Country Meadows did not seek to join in any settlement 
discussion, it filed no motions and it made no indications that 
it was prepared to proceed with its appeal. After five years of 
this unexplained delay, Country Meadows filed a Motion in 
if 
Opposition and Motion for Summary Judgment only after the 
Division initiated steps to resolve this matter. These factors 
clearly establish that Country Meadows' failure to prosecute was 
caused by its inexcusable neglect. 
In citing the 1988 Roner letter, Country Meadows merely 
attempts to divert attention away from its own inexcusable 
conduct. A simple review of the Roner letter shows that this 
letter should have prompted Country Meadows to move forward with 
its district court appeal in order to resolve its outstanding 
Medicaid reimbursement for subsequent years. Thus, Country 
Meadows cannot use this correspondence from Mr. Roner to 
establish that either the Division failed to act or that the 
Division discouraged Country Meadows from prosecuting its pending 
appeal. On the contrary, the Roner letter is further evidence of 
Country Meadows' inexcusable neglect. 
Country Meadows insists that it was the Division of Health 
Care Financing's obligation to move the case forward and that the 
Division forestalled furtherance of the appeal. Country Meadows 
believes that the Division of Health Care Financing should have 
filed an Order to Show Cause or conducted additional exit 
conferences with Country Meadows regarding these 1979 claims for 
reimbursement. Further, Country Meadows contends that the 
Division should have pursued further review of several matters 
17 
which not resolved in its favor during the administrative 
hearing. However, viewing the formal hearing decision in its 
entirety, the Division was satisfied with the outcome of the 
hearing and never filed a petition for review in district court. 
Therefore, it is clear that Country Meadows' neglect in 
prosecuting this action is inexcusable. 
In Westinahouse, the court stated that "it is . . . 
important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence 
of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and 
to do justice between them." Westinahouse, 544 P.2d at 879. The 
possibility of injustice is the most important factor in 
reviewing a claim that the trial judge abused his discretion. Id. 
Country Meadows had an "opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice," during its formal administrative hearing on July 9, 
1985. Country Meadows has been granted an opportunity to present 
its evidence and have its case decided on the merits. Country 
Meadows' lack of "due diligence" not the actions of either 
the Division or the decision of the trial judge dismissing this 
action thwarted its opportunity for further judicial review. 
Therefore, Country Meadows will not be substantially prejudiced 
if this Court upholds the lower court's ruling of dismissal. 
By contrast, the Division of Health Care Financing would be 
substantially prejudiced if Judge Frederick's dismissal for 
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failure to prosecute is overturned. In 1981, Congress 
dramatically changed the methodology by which nursing homes 
receive Medicaid reimbursement. This case by Country Meadows 
represents the only remaining case under the pre-1981 
reimbursement methodology. The Division on Health Care Financing 
maintained accurate records during the administrative proceedings 
and continued to maintain these records until at least 1988. Had 
Country Meadows proceeded with its appeal, the Division would 
have retained all the necessary records to move forward with this 
appeal. If the dismissal were overturned, the Division would be 
unable to accurately determine the rate or reimbursement that 
Country Meadows should receive under the pre-1981 formula. 
Country Meadows' delay in prosecution has substantially 
prejudiced the Division's ability to defend its actions. 
Further, Country Meadows relies on Department of Social 
Services v. Romero, 609 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1980) in support of its 
claim that its failure to proceed should be justified by the 
Division's purported failure to act. Romero is easily 
distinguished on its particular facts, however. In Romero, the 
court ruled that the lower court abused its discretion when it 
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to 
prosecute. The court stated that it was the "totality of the 
circumstances,f which determined the proper grounds for dismissal. 
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Romero, 609 P. 2d at 1324. 
In reversing the lower court's dismissal, the court, 
however, pointed to the fact that the defendant, a fraudulent 
welfare recipient, actually benefited by and was perfectly 
content with plaintiff's delay in prosecution. The Romero court 
found that the trial judge had not properly considered the 
defendant's role in the delay and determined that both parties 
had equal opportunity to move the case forward. Id. at 1323-24. 
In determining that the lower court had abused its discretion, 
the court stated that the defendant was apprised of the trial 
date and that he made no effort to ascertain the cause of the 
delay. More importantly, the court determined that the defendant 
was in no way harmed by the delay and that it would be unfair to 
allow defendant to sit silently by and then "attempt[ing] to 
blame the other party for the delay as a means of escaping the 
effects of a judgment based on . . . misrepresentation and 
cheating." Id. at 1324. 
Nothing in Romero either validates or mitigates Country 
Meadows' failure to prosecute in the instant case. Here, a State 
agency's decision to limit Medicaid reimbursement to a nursing 
home had already been adjudicated by an impartial hearing officer 
and upheld. The Division was satisfied with this ruling and, in 
fact, contacted Country Meadows in 1988 explaining that no 
20 
subsequent action should be taken on Country Meadows' requests 
for additional reimbursement until resolution of its appeal. 
Unlike Romero. the Division would be adversely affected if this 
Court rewards Country Meadows' inexcusable neglect. 
Country Meadows has failed to show that its failure to 
prosecute for a protracted period was justified and has failed to 
show any abuse of discretion by the trial court. Therefore, 
Judge Frederick's order of dismissal for failure to prosecute 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER GRANTING THE DIVISION'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS VOID FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
Following Judge Frederick's dismissal of Country Meadows' 
appeal for failure to prosecute, the Court granted the Division 
of Health Care Financing's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
However, the Court was without jurisdiction at that juncture of 
the proceedings to rule on any subsequent matters. 
Issues of jurisdiction are questions of law and therefore a 
correction of error standard applies with no deference accorded 
the lower court's ruling. State Dept. of Social Services v. 
Villi. 784 P. 2d 1130# 1132 (Utah 1989). 
In Power Train, Inc. v Stuver, 550 P. 2d 1293 (Utah 1976), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that: ,fA dismissal not only 
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postpones the action as a stay might have done, it discontinues 
the complaint completely, so an entirely new suit must be 
instituted to bring the cause before the court again." J^ i. at 
1294. In Power Train, the court overturned a dismissal of a 
securities action on the grounds that a stay should have been 
issued until a simultaneous action in California was resolved. 
In the instant case, a stay is not what was requested by the 
Division, nor would it have served any logical purpose in light 
of the long delay caused by Country Meadows' inaction. The 
dismissal by the district court, in the instant case, did just 
that it discontinued the case and the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to review any and all other matters before it. 
Indeed, following the dismissal, Country Meadows would have been 
required to file a new claim to have any other substantive or 
procedural motions considered by the court. 
In Keenan Pipe & Supply Co. v. Superior Court of County of 
Pima, 383 P. 2d 864 (Ariz. 1963), the Arizona Supreme Court 
determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue 
an Order to Show Cause and other substantive orders once the 
court had dismissed the action. Quoting the general rule 
established in Smurda v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 
266 P. 843, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928), the court stated: 
f[T]he effect of a dismissal . . . is ipso facto to 
terminate the case and oust the court of jurisdiction 
22 
to proceed. 
It follows that, although the court had previously 
possessed jurisdiction over the persons and the 
subject-matter of the suit in question, such 
jurisdiction had been completely lost. Hence the 
judgment rendered and all other steps taken 
subsequently to the dismissal of the action are void 
for want of jurisdiction.' 
Keenan, 383 P. 2d at 866. 
Further, in the case of Love v. Rocky Mountain Kennel Club, 
514 P. 2d 336 (Colo. App. 1973), the Colorado Court of Appeals 
stated that "a dismissal . . . for failure to prosecute is a 
final order." Id. at 337 The court ruled that where the 
plaintiff had made an untimely motion to reinstate its case 
following the court's dismissal, "the trial court was without 
authority to reinstate the case or to provide further relief." 
Id. Similarly, Judge Frederick lacked the authority to grant the 
Division's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment after he had 
dismissed the action based on Country Meadows' failure to 
prosecute. That dismissal terminated the court's authority and 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
A court may grant attorney's fees concurrent with an order 
of dismissal, but lacks jurisdiction to act following the entry 
of the order. In Crawford v. Crawford, 514 P. 2d 1050, (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1973), the court stated that "where a party has been 
dismissed, . . . he may not thereafter apply for relief based on 
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that suit since the court no longer has jurisdiction to enter 
that relief." JEd. at 1051. However, "attorney's fees may be 
included in the order of dismissal, at the [cjourt's discretion." 
Id. Where the Division's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment was 
not ruled upon until after dismissal of Country Meadows' appeal, 
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on any subsequent 
matters. 
It is clear that the district court granted the Division's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment only after it had granted the 
Division's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. The court 
was without jurisdiction to proceed on any further matters 
following the dismissal of Country Meadows' appeal.6 Thus, 
Judge Frederick's order granting summary judgment is void for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
lower court's dismissal of Country Meadows' appeal and vacate 
6
 If this Court were to overturn Judge Frederick's 
dismissal order, the only other appropriate relief would be 
remand of the case for further proceedings. 
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Judge Frederick's subsequent order granting the Division's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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